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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 12, 2015, thirteen-year-old James Ransom suffered a head
injury after colliding with another player during a youth football game in Ladera
Ranch, California.1 The hit was hard but not debilitating enough to raise
concern.2 James played on.3 After the game, James’s father noticed dried blood
around his son’s ear and the symptoms of a concussion beginning to set in.4
Within days, James’s temperament changed from sweet and amiable to
aggressive and unpredictable.5 James began suffering from oculomotor nerve
palsy in his left eye, prolonged dizziness, nausea, and thoughts of suicide.6 His
family sought medical and psychiatric help, but their attempts at saving James’s
life were futile.7 On November 30, 2016, just fourteen months after the hit, James
Ransom took his own life.8
1.
About
James
Henry
Ransom,
JAMES
HENRY
RANSOM
FOUND.,
https://www.jameshenryransomfoundation.org/about (last visited May 30, 2019) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Ryan Kartje, Ladera Ranch Family Pushes for Change in Youth Football After Loss of Son, THE
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Apr. 30, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/04/28/ladera-ranchfamily-pushes-for-change-in-youth-football-after-loss-of-son (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1.
5. About James Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1.
6.
See
Oculomotor
Nerve
Palsy,
THE
FREE
DICTIONARY
BY
FARLEX,
https://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/oculomotor+nerve+palsy (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “oculomotor nerve palsy” as an eye condition resulting
from damage to the third cranial nerve and which restricts eye movement and muscle response); About James
Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1.
7. About James Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1.
8. Id.
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James’s story is not uncommon.9 Studies show that during practice, football
players aged 9–12 experience high-magnitude hits 8% of the time.10 Another
study found that youth football players are twice as likely to develop mood and
behavioral issues in the future than their peers.11 Moreover, individuals suffering
from a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), caused by trauma to the head, are twice as
likely to commit suicide than individuals without the condition.12
Recent studies, Hollywood films, and legislation discussing the connection
between concussions and football are creating a frenzy over the popular
American sport.13 While many fans attempt to turn a blind eye to the commotion,
football’s future is becoming less and less certain.14 Participation in youth
programs dropped almost 20% after 2009, and many communities are replacing
tackle football with programs such as flag football or “rookie tackle.”15 Class
9. See generally Ryan Kartje, Law to Ban Tackle Football for California Youth Falls Short of Committee,
THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Apr. 30, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/04/27/law-toban-tackle-football-for-california-youth-falls-short-of-committee (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (reporting on two mothers who both lost their sons to CTE).
10. See Catherine Thorbecke, Children Who Play Football May Take More Hits to the Head Than
Originally
Thought,
Study
Finds,
ABC
NEWS
(Oct.
17,
2017,
8:17
AM
ET),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/children-play-football-hits-head-originally-thought-study/story?id=50519830
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (finding that, out of 45 football players, accumulatively,
the players experienced over 7,500 hits throughout 30 practices with 8% of hits considered “high magnitude,”
[defined as greater than 40 times the force of gravity]. The study additionally found that quarterbacks, running
backs, and linebackers were the most susceptible to high magnitude hits).
11. Rick Maese, Study Shows Playing Football Before Age 12 Can Lead to Mood and Behavior Issues,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/study-shows-playingfootball-before-age-12-can-lead-to-mood-and-behavior-issues/2017/09/18/1b3ebc1c-9cac-11e7-8ea1ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.c5cfd4745f57 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. Kevin Kunsmann, Concussions, TBI Associated with Nearly Two-Fold Greater Risk of Suicide, MD
MAGAZINE (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.mdmag.com/medical-news/concussions-tbi-associated-with-nearlytwofold-greater-risk-of-suicide (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. See What is CTE?, BRAIN INJURY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, http://www.protectthebrain.org/BrainInjury-Research/What-is-CTE-.aspx (last visited May 30, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (discussing Dr. Omalu’s discovery of CTE in former NFL football players); CONCUSSION (Sony
Pictures 2015); California Youth Football Act: Hearings on A.B. 1 Before the Assemb. Comm. On Arts,
Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter 1
Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing] (listing prior and related legislation on the topic of football
safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.); see generally Noah Frank, Bad Brains: Inside the Concussion
Crisis, WTOP (Aug. 29, 2017, 2:41 AM), https://wtop.com/nfl/2017/08/whats-happening-to-footballs-brains/
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“If there’s one thing everyone WTOP spoke to for this
series seems to agree on, it’s that there is no uniform, simple fix for the crisis of brain injury in football.”).
14. See generally Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wade, For the NFL and All of Football, a New Threat:
An Evaporating Insurance Market, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019, 11:26 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/nflfootball-threat-evaporating-insurance-market/story?id=60446104 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (quoting John Butler, Pop Warner’s executive director, “People say football will never go away,
but if we can’t get insurance, it will.”).
15. Alex Pew & Danielle Shapiro, MD, MPH, Football and Brain Injuries: What You Need to Know,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, http://www.center4research.org/football-brain-injuries-needknow/ (last visited June 18, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see FAQ What is
Rookie Tackle? USA FOOTBALL, https://assets.usafootball.com/documents/rookietackle/faq.pdf (last visited July
9, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “rookie tackle” as a bridge game
between flag football and 11-player tackle football as to safely introduce tackle football to younger players).
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action lawsuits against popular football leagues, such as the Pop Warner youth
league and the National Football League (“NFL”), perpetuate the hysteria.16
Alongside the influx of litigation, insurers are refusing to cover football
programs; Members of the California Legislature have attempted a complete ban
on the sport.17
Chapter 158 compels various safety regulations for youth tackle football
programs, mirroring regulations AB 2127 enacted for high school and middle
school programs in 2014.18 After numerous legislative brawls over youth
football’s viability, Chapter 158 is California’s “Hail Mary” attempt at appeasing
opponents of youth football while still keeping the sport afloat.19 Despite
California’s wish to walk the line, Chapter 158 fails to address the safety issues
inherent to the sport and sets new precedent by regulating the “private” sport
industry.20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the past five years, California legislators have developed a series of bills
regarding youth football safety and standards.21 Concerned parents, retired
football players, and medical professionals are leading the movement to address
the topic.22 The mass support for football safety reform is due to emerging
science and increased publicity of stories like James’s.23 Section A examines Dr.
16. See generally Micheal Martinez, Pop Warner Settles Concussion Suit Filed by Former Player Who
Committed Suicide, CNN (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/us/pop-warner-concussion-lawsuitsettlement-player-suicide/index.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The [Pop
Warner] settlement demonstrates how concerns about concussion-related brain damage have grown from the
NFL to the youngest levels of football.”).
17. A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not
enacted); see Fainaru & Fainaru-Wade, supra note 14 (discussing the increase in insurance companies
unwillingness to insure professional football against head injuries since 2011).
18. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158) (outlining similar
requirements, such as limiting full-contact practices, to AB 2127); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (enacted by 2014
Stat. Ch. 165).
19. See id. (setting forth various protocols in concussion management and detection); What is Hail Mary
(pass)?, SPORTING CHARTS, https://www.sportingcharts.com/dictionary/nfl/hail-mary-pass.aspx (last visited on
July 14, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “Hail Mary” as a very long,
typically unsuccessful pass made in a desperate attempt to score late in a football game).
20. Infra Sections IV.A–B.
21. See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.).
22. See Kartje, supra note 4 (reporting on the pleads by a family for change in youth football after the
death of their son due to a football-caused concussion); see also Elaine Schmidt, Parents, Coaches, and Doctors
Learn Ways to Prevent Concussions Among Young Football Players, UCLA NEWSROOM (July 9, 2014)
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/parents-coaches-and-doctors-learn-ways-to-prevent-concussion-among-youngfootball-players (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the presentations of Dr.
Christopher Giza, director of the BrainSPORT program and a professor of neurosurgery at the David Geffen
School of Medicine at UCLA, and Patrick Larimore, former UCLA football player, on concussions at 2014
UCLA conference).
23. Infra Section II.A–C.
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Bennet Omalu’s discovery of a degenerative brain disease called Chronic
Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) in 2002.24 Section B discusses multiple
lawsuits against the NFL and Pop Warner in response to Dr. Omalu’s
discovery.25 Section C evaluates various state and federal responses regarding
concussion management.26
A. Linking Football to Concussions: The Discovery of CTE
In 2002, after conducting several autopsies on former NFL players, forensic
pathologist Dr. Omalu discovered a degenerative brain disease called CTE.27
During the postmortem examination of Mike Webster, former Pittsburgh Steeler,
Dr. Omalu found that the constant head blows experienced by Webster caused
microscopic injuries to the brain.28 These minor injuries led to the accumulation
of tau proteins in the cerebral tissue and, ultimately, permanent brain damage.29
Dr. Omalu warned that indicators of CTE—such as mood disorders, depression,
suicidal tendencies, and disinhibition—could manifest hours after a hit or
decades later.30
B. Negligence Suits Against Prominent Football Leagues
After to Dr. Omalu’s discovery, the NFL’s Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
Committee denied any connection between football and CTE and demanded the
renunciation of Dr. Omalu’s research.31 Despite the substantial pressure the NFL
placed on Dr. Omalu, he continued researching and raising awareness of the
long-term consequences associated with America’s number one sport.32
24. Infra Section II.A.
25. Infra Section II.B.
26. Infra Section II.C.
27. Dr. Bennet Omalu Bio, BRAIN INJURY INST., http://www.protectthebrain.org/Our-Team/Bennet-IOmalu-M-D-.aspx (last visited June 18, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Doctor
Behind ‘Concussion’ Wanted to ‘Enhance the Lives of Football Players’, NPR (Dec. 27, 2015, 5:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2015/12/27/460870529/doctor-behind-concussion-wanted-to-enhance-the-lives-offootball-players [hereinafter Doctor Behind ‘Concussion’] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
28. Doctor Behind ‘Concussion’, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see Kristalyn Salters-Pedneault, PhD, Disinhibition (Impulsivity) in BPD, VERY WELL MIND
(June 18, 2018), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-disinhibition-425293 (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (defining “disinhibition” as “reduced control over your impulses, or urges, which
means being unable to stop, delay, or change (“inhibit”) an action that it not appropriate for the situation you’re
in.”).
31. See Mikayla Paolini, NFL Takes a Page from the Big Tobacco Playbook: Assumption of Risk in the
CTE Crisis, 68, EMORY L.J. 608, 614–15 (2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(discussing the NFL’s denial Omalu’s work and subsequent orchestration of private studies claiming low
concussion rates among NFL players).
32. See id. (discussing the NFL’s denial Omalu’s work and subsequent orchestration of private studies
claiming low concussion rates among NFL players); Jim Norman, Football Still Americans’ Favorite Sport to
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1. The National Football League Settlement
Despite over 4,500 lawsuits against the league, the NFL denied the presence
of CTE and other brain diseases in football players.33 After consolidating the
lawsuits into a class-action suit, retired NFL players argued the NFL breached its
duty to protect its players’ well-being.34 The NFL maintained that its players
assumed the “known, apparent, and reasonably foreseeable consequences of
athletic participation.”35 Players fought back, accusing the NFL of denying and
actively concealing the link between football and chronic neurological
disorders—such as CTE.36 Previous caselaw provides that courts may hold a
sports league liable if the league fails to clearly convey the known dangers
associated with the game.37 The lawsuit settled in 2016 with the United States
Supreme Court affirming the $1 billion monetary award for affected players and
their family members.38 Despite the symbolic end to an almost decade-long
dispute, the messy details of the settlement continue to make national headlines.39
Courts continue to deny hundreds of claims for relief by victims and their
families, allowing the NFL pay less than half of the total payout awarded to
plaintiffs by the Court.40
2. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc. Settles First and Only Negligence
Lawsuit
In 2015, Wisconsin mother Debra Pyka sued Pop Warner—the nation’s

Watch, GALLUP (Jan. 4, 2018) https://news.gallup.com/poll/224864/football-americans-favorite-sportwatch.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“football claimed the top spot [as
American’s most popular sport] in 1972 and has been the public’s favorite ever since.”).
33. Katie Moisse, Youth Football Leagues Hope for Boost from NFL Settlement, ABC NEWS (Aug. 30,
2013),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/youth-football-leagues-hope-boost-nflsettlemen%20t/story?id=20120881 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
34. Richard Weinmeyer, JD, MPhil, Concussion-Related Litigation Against the National Football
League, AMA J. OF ETHICS (July 2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/concussion-relatedlitigation-against-national-football-league/2014-07 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
35. See Paolini, supra note 31 at 626–27 (discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk as applied to
sports torts).
36. See id. (discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk as applied to sports torts).
37. E.g., Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 55 Cal. 4th 1148, 1152 (Cal. 2012) (holding that an individual
assumes the risk associated with bumper car collisions at an amusement park); The NFL Concussion Lawsuit,
LAWSHELF, https://lawshelf.com/blog/post/the-nfl-concussion-lawsuit (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
38. The NFL Concussion Lawsuit, LAWSHELF, supra note 37.
39. See Dom Conentino, The NFL Concussion Settlement Just Keeps Getting Worse and Worse,
DEADSPIN (May 17, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://deadspin.com/the-nfl-concussion-settlement-just-keeps-gettingworse-1834651117 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the recent developments
in the NFL lawsuit).
40. See id. (discussing that the total payout by the NFL for all concussion-based lawsuits so far is less
than $500 million).
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largest youth football league—for negligence after her son committed suicide.41
Pyka argued that her son developed CTE during his four-year stint in youth
football, and that the disease was a substantial factor of his death in 2012.42 She
claimed Pop Warner was liable because the program failed to limit full-contact
practices and properly train coaches in concussion protocol and helmet safety.43
Pyka sought $5 million in damages; however, Pop Warner settled the suit for $2
million.44 Despite the resolution, Pop Warner accused Pyka of waging “a public
crusade to ban football.”45 The settlement became the first and only lawsuit
against Pop Warner but signified the growing concern over the game’s
viability.46
C. Legislatures Implement Various Safety Procedures Regarding Concussion
Management
After the surge of litigation claiming safety oversight, football leagues
began implementing their own changes to the sport.47 Pop Warner made
substantive revisions, such as eliminating the three-point stance, and the NFL
banned numerous blocks and hits formerly permitted.48 On the sidelines, federal
and state legislatures began regulating the game’s various procedural aspects.49
Section 1 discusses the federal government’s attempts to establish laws to
prevent and manage concussions.50 Section 2 reviews the groundbreaking state
laws regarding the topic.51 Section 3 analyzes California’s laws, and attempted
laws, that regulate concussion protocol and football safety.52
1. Federal Laws
Although the United States Congress has not enacted any laws regarding
41. Pyka v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., No. 3:2015cv00057 (W.D. Wis. filed Feb. 5, 2015).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Fainaru & Fainaru-Wade, supra note 14.
46. Josh Kosman, Youth Football May Never Be the Same After This, NEW YORK POST (March 8, 2016,
11:06 AM), https://nypost.com/2016/03/08/pop-warner-football-settles-concussion-lawsuit/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. Bob Cook, More Pop Warner Safety Changes Come As The Battle For Football’s Soul Intensifies,
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2019/03/04/more-pop-warner-safety-changescome-as-the-battle-for-footballs-soul-intensifies/#721f63087706 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
48. Id.; see Health and Safety Rules Changes, NFL, https://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/nfl-opshonoring-the-game/health-safety-rules-changes/ (last visited on July 13, 2019) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (referring to the various changes made to NFL football rules since 1985).
49. Infra Sections III.C.1–3
50. Infra Section III.C.1
51. Infra Section III.C.2
52. Infra Section III.C.3.
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nationwide concussion management or safety, members have introduced
legislation on the topic.53 In addition, Congress has been taking steps to address
brain injuries in the United States since the mid-1990s.54 In 1996, President Bill
Clinton signed the Traumatic Brain Injury Act (“TBIA”) into law.55 Notably, the
TBIA defined a TBI and allotted federal funds for states to research and improve
TBI rehabilitation and prevention.56 Congress reauthorized the TBIA in 2014,
which allowed federal appropriations to continue throughout the 2019 fiscal
year.57
Congress also proposed the Concussion Treatment and Care Tools
(“ConTACT”) Act in 2010 to address the “prevention, identification, treatment,
and management of concussions.”58 The bill—which did not pass the committee
process—proposed a nation-wide concussion guideline for youth athletes.59 It
included a “return-to-play” protocol for purposes of post-concussion health, and
the collection of concussion-related data among school-aged children.60 After its
2010 failure, Congress reintroduced the ConTACT Act in 2013 but again rejected
the bill.61
In January 2019, Representative Joyce Beatty introduced the Concussion
Awareness and Education Act.62 The act, not yet enacted, would collect and
disseminate data regarding brain injuries among youths to increase the awareness
of sports-related concussions.63 The Concussion Awareness and Education Act
would establish a Concussion Research Commission dedicated to reviewing and
recommending concussion-related findings.64 The Concussion Research
Commission would also recruit the help of entities such as national sports
associations, trainers’ associations, as well as parents, coaches, and students to
support their findings.65 The findings would include data like the amount of
concussions among individuals between the ages of 5–21, the cause of the

53. Elizabeth Etherton, Systematic Negligence: The NCAA Concussion Management Plan and Its
Limitations, 21 SPORTS L. J. 1, 21 (2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing
the different legislation introduced by the United States Congress on concussion management).
54. Id. at 22.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Traumatic Brain Injury Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-166, 110, Stat. 1445 (1996)).
57. Traumatic Brain Injury Act, BRAIN INJURY ASS’N OF AMERICA, https://www.biausa.org/publicaffairs/public-policy/traumatic-brain-injury-act (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
58. Etherton, supra note 53 at 22-23 (2014) (quoting Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2012,
H.R. 1247, 111th Cong. (2010)).
59. Id. (quoting Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2012, H.R. 1247, 111th Cong. (2010)).
60. Id. at 23 (discussing Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2012, H.R. 1247, 111th Cong.
(2010)).
61. Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2013, H.R. 3113, 113th Cong. (2013).
62. H.R. 280, 116th Cong. (2019).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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concussions, and the injured individual’s concussion history.66
2. State Laws
In 2009, Washington became the first state to pass a law implementing a
concussion protocol in sports.67 The Lystedt Law, also known as the “shake-it-off
law,” prevents youth athletes from prematurely returning to play after showing
signs of a head injury.68 Just one month after the passage of the Lystedt Law,
Oregon passed Max’s Law—a similar piece of legislation.69 Max’s Law
implemented concussion management guidelines—such as the catchy “recognize,
remove, refer, return,” protocol for all school districts in the state.70 Since the
passage of Max’s and the Lystedt Laws, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted laws implementing concussion procedures in youth
and/or high school sports.71
3. California Laws
California has implemented several legislative measures to address concerns
surrounding football safety.72 In 2014, Governor Brown signed AB 2127 into
law.73 AB 2127 limited full contact practices and required concussed studentathletes to complete a seven-day graduated “return-to-play” protocol.74 Since the
bill restricts full-contact practice time, Senator Joel Anderson called the bill “an
overreach.”75 Anderson and other bill opponents argued that the government
should not regulate substantive aspects of football, such as full-contact practice
and player conduct.76 However, AB 2127 passed and took effect on January 15,

66. Id.
67. Get a Heads Up on Concussion in Sports Policies, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/policy/HeadsUpOnConcussionInSportsPolicies-a.pdf (last visited June 22,
2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See S. Res. 348, 75th Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (“Each school district shall ensure that
coaches receive annual training to learn how to recognize the symptoms of a concussion and how to seek proper
medical treatment for a person suspected of having a concussion.”).
71.
Concussion
ToolKit
for
Psychologists,
AMERICAN
PSYCH.
ASS’N,
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pmr/documents/concussion_toolkit/la
ws/state.htm (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
72. See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.).
73. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (enacted by 2014 Stat. Ch. 165).
74. Id.
75. Patrick McGreevy & Eric Sondheimer, New Law Restricts Full-Contact Football Practice for High
School Teams, LA TIMES (July 21, 2014, 8:06 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/highschool/la-sp-highschool-football-20140722-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
76. Id.
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2015.77
Two years after AB 2127 passed, the Legislature passed AB 2007—also
known as the Concussion Management in Youth Sports Act.78 AB 2007
expanded AB 2127 and implemented several protocols to educate football
coaches, parents, and athletes from twenty-seven different youth sports programs
on concussion symptoms.79 Mike Chisar, Government Affairs Committee Chair
for the California Athletic Trainers’ Association, claimed AB 2127 “place[d]
California at the forefront of . . . concussion management at the youth sports
level.”80
Assembly Members Kevin McCarty and Lorena Gonzalez proposed AB
2108 in 2017, which sought to completely ban youth football for all children
under the age of twelve.81 AB 2108 omitted all praise of youth football and aimed
to eradicate the problems associated with the sport, such as TBIs.82 Despite the
radical proposition, Assembly Member McCarty denied the bill was an
overreach.83 He maintained that he had “an obligation to protect children from
dangerous, long-term injuries.”84 In fact, several other states—including New
York, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey—proposed similar bans during the
same year.85 However, AB 2108 and all other bills attempting to ban youth
football met powerful public backlash and quickly failed.86
III. CHAPTER 158
Chapter 158, also known as the California Youth Football Act, implements
an extensive safety scheme for all youth tackle football programs in California.87
Chapter 158 limits full-contact practices to thirty minutes per practice with no
more than two full-contact practices per week.88 Additionally, the California
Youth Football Act also prohibits all contact training during the youth program’s
77. AB 2127 – Concussions and Head Injuries: Full-Contact Football Practices, KINGSLEY BOGARD
LLP (July 22, 2014) https://kblegal.us/ab-2127-concussions-and-head-injuries-full-contact-football-practices/
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
78. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (enacted by 2014 Stat. Ch. 165); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124235
(enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516).
79. HEALTH & SAFETY § 124235 (enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516).
80. Id.; Governor Signs Concussion Management Measure Into Law, CALIFORNIA ATHLETIC TRAINERS’
ASS’N, https://ca-at.org/governor-signs-concussion-management-measure-into-law/ (last visited June 20, 2019)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
81. A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not
enacted).
82. Id.
83. Kartje, supra note 9.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158); Assembly Committee, Floor
Analysis of SB 1, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019).
88. HEALTH & SAFETY § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158).
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off-season.89
Chapter 158 also implements various off-the field procedural regulations.90
Chapter 158 requires youth football programs to organize divisions by relative
weight, age, or a combination of weight and age.91 Additionally, coaches must
conduct a ten-hour minimum of non-contact practice at the beginning of each
season to acclimate players to equipment and tackle safety.92 Chapter 158 also
requires coaches to attend yearly head injury training and complete a nationallyrecognized tackling and blocking certificate.93
IV. ANALYSIS
The California Youth Football Alliance hails Chapter 158 as a “nationwide
model for best practices in youth football,” aligning California with seven other
states regulating the sport.94 However, just one year prior to the enactment of
Chapter 158, the same alliance condemned the legislature for overstepping its
authority in proposing AB 2108.95 Parents, coaches, and fans across California
united to oppose the bill banning tackle football for all children under the age of
12, quickly killing it.96 Despite its milder appearance, Chapter 158 is no
different.97
California’s most recent attempt at appeasing everyone, in reality, appeases
few.98 Persons against youth football argue Chapter 158 lacks true initiatives to
protect California’s youth.99 Conversely, strong supporters of football argue that
Chapter 158 exceeds the Legislature’s authority by regulating a parent and
coach’s right to choose.100 While Chapter 158 is an honest effort at keeping youth
players safe, it neither exemplifies innovation in concussion management nor
follows past precedent allowing private sports entities to self-regulate.101
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158).
94. 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (statement by California Youth
Football Alliance); Cindy Bowen, Amid Growing Concern Over Head Injuries California Limits Full-Contact
Football Practices, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2014/07/22/amid-growing-concern-over-head-injuries-california-limits-full-contact-footballpractices/?noredirect=on (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
95. Kartje, supra note 9.
96. Kartje, supra note 9.
97. See Dionne L. Koller, Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport, 43 PEPP. L. REV., 681, 682–83
(2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the government’s “hands-off”
approach to regulating sports and the new era of regulation via concussion management laws).
98. See generally id. at 716–18 (discussing the critical view of concussion management laws).
99. Id. at 719.
100. Id.; see McGreevy & Sondheimer, supra note 75 (discussing Sen. Joel Andersons rejection of
similar bill, AB 2127, over concerns of legislative overreach in regulating full-contact practice time).
101. See generally id. at 716–18 (discussing the skeptical view of government regulation in sports); see

343

2020 / Addressing the Hit Against America’s Number One Sport
Section A evaluates California’s right to regulate private sports, such as the
leagues Chapter 158 would impact.102 Section B analyzes the United States’
precedent of allowing American sports leagues to largely regulate themselves.103
Section C analyzes whether this model of autonomy is laudable or even viable.104
A. California’s Power to Regulate Private Sport
The state’s police power is the “power to govern–the inherent reserved power
of the state to subject individual rights to reasonable regulation for the general
welfare.”105 The state may regulate anything that aims to further the peace,
safety, morals, health, or welfare of the public.106 Police power is valid unless the
court deems the law “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and has no . . .
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.”107
Chapter 158 is undisputedly a valid exercise of California’s police power.108
Chapter 158 seeks to protect the state’s youth football players from the severe
and long-term effects of brain injuries.109 However, despite its legitimate exercise
of authority, Chapter 158 trailblazes a relatively new frontier: regulating the
private sports industry.110
B. Self-Regulation in American Sports
The government’s lack of intervention in the private sports industry draws
similar comparisons with other burgeoning industries.111 In 2019, the Federal
Aviation Administration (“FAA”) drew criticism after news broke that the
agency delegated virtually unchecked authority to the Boeing Company to certify

McGreevy & Sondheimer, supra note 75 (discussing AB 2108 overreach into coaches and parents right to
choose and coach).
102. Infra Section IV.A.
103. Infra Section IV.B.
104. Infra Section IV.C.
105. Massingill v. Dep’t. of Food & Agric., 102 Cal. App. 4th 498, 504 (2002).
106. See id. at 503 (2002) (holding that the air and water are essential to the safe operation of motor
vehicle and therefore a law mandating the free issuance of such services at gas stations is a proper exercise of
the state’s policing powers).
107. Id. at 504 (2002).
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158); see generally Massingill, 102
Cal. App. 4th at 504 (2002) (holding that the air and water are essential to the safe operation of motor vehicle
and therefore a law mandating the free issuance of such services at gas stations is a proper exercise of the state’s
policing powers).
109. HEALTH & SAFETY § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158).
110. See generally id. (enacting mandates that regulate the private sports industry, such as youth football
leagues, like Pop Warner football); infra Section IV.A–D.
111. See Brian Naylor, Boeing’s Not Alone in Companies That Government Agencies Have Let SelfRegulate, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709203191/boeings-not-alone-in-companiesthat-government-agencies-have-let-self-regulate (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(discussing the self-regulation of Boeing aircrafts by the FAA).
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its own 737 MAX jets.112 The public has also chastised the Federal Railroad
Administration and the Food and Drug Administration for allowing selfregulation within their agencies.113 While the public criticizes such government
entities for their lack of supervision, some scholars argue that agencies simply
lack the resources, expertise, or technology to probe fast-evolving industry
standards.114
A similar dilemma faces the sports industry.115 American sports fans argue
the precedent for allowing private sports associations to self-regulate should
continue, while opponents contend that government intervention is key.116
Subsection 1 outlines the history of limited government intervention in American
sports.117 Subsection 2 illustrates this same trend in Olympic sports.118 Subsection
3 analyzes the lack of government intervention in interscholastic and
intercollegiate sports, and Subsection 4 discusses self-regulation in professional
sports.119 Finally, Subsection 5 reviews California’s historical deference towards
the sports industry within the state.120
1. Historic Background of the “Hands-Off” Approach
Unlike the 2019 FAA/Boeing incident, there is currently no government
entity responsible for the over 21.5 million children playing team sports in
America.121 Many scholars refer to America’s youth and amateur sports structure
as the “Wild West.”122 Despite the nickname, the government has seemingly
designed the chaotic nature of American sports.123 The notion that governments
should stay out of sports stems from the individualized, private, and voluntary

112. Id.; see Emily Stewart, Delta’s CEO says the Boeing 737 Max 8 Scandal Has “Traumatized” the
Aviation Industry, VOX (June 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/6/11/18657008/ed-bastian-deltaboeing-737-max-scandal (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the Boeing
Company’s, an American corporation that designs, manufactures, and sells airplanes, 737 MAX jet airplane’s
involvement in two crashes within a span of months).
113. Naylor, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. Infra Sections IV.A–D.
116. See Koller, supra note 97 at 682 (2016) (discussing John McCain’s belief that government should
involve themselves in sports as little as possible); see McGreevy & Sondheimer, supra note 75 (discussing
Legislators belief that concussion laws are an overreach by the state).
117. Infra Section IV.B.1.
118. Infra Section IV.B.2.
119. Infra Sections IV.B.3–4.
120. Infra Section IV.B.5.
121. Bruce Kelley & Carl Carchia, “Hey Data Data—Swing!,” ESPN (July 16, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9469252/hidden-demographics-youth-sports-espn-magazine (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
122. Id.
123. See Koller, supra note 97 at 685–589 (discussing the popular American view that the government
should stay out of the business of regulating sports).
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nature of the industry.124 Other scholars argue that the hands-off approach is due
to American’s “mystique, nostalgia, and romantic…cultural fixation” on sports
that government officials refuse to tinker with.125 The government’s laissez-faire
approach extends to amateur, interscholastic, intercollegiate, and even
professional sports.126
2. Self-Regulation in Olympic Sports
In 1977, President Ford created the Commission on Olympic Sports,
encouraging the United States to rely on free enterprise—rather than federal
regulations—to help finance amateur athletes.127 This non-interventionist concept
stemmed from American’s distaste towards communist Olympic opponents
during the Cold War.128 Congress followed, creating the United States Olympic
Committee—a federally chartered, non-profit, patriotic corporation––which
recruited privately-incorporated National Governing Bodies to support the
nation’s Olympic athletes.129
3. Self-Regulation in Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Sports
The federal government has also granted generous legal sovereignty to
intercollegiate and interscholastic sports.130 Since its inception in 1906, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) has regulated intercollegiate
athletics with “tremendous judicial deference and goodwill.”131 Courts have also
denied constitutional protections to interscholastic athletes, maintaining that
participation in athletics is a privilege, not a right.132 When disputes arise
regarding internal sports issues—such as eligibility matters and rules of plays—
courts typically defer to the sports bodies to manage themselves.133

124. Id. at 689.
125. See id. at 685 (quoting James H. Frey & D. Stanley Eitzen, Sport and Society, 17 ANN. REV. SOC.
503, 503–04 (1991)).
126. Id. at 688.
127. Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in
the Pursuit of National Prestige, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2008).
128. Koller, supra note 97 at 689; Koller, supra note 127.
129. Koller, supra note 97 at 690.
130. Id. at 691.
131. Id. at 692.
132. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 100 (W.D. Va. 2007)
(maintaining that the participation in interscholastic athletics was a privilege, thus the Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect such a privilege).
133. See generally Crane by Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1319–20 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding there was no legal remedy for a student’s ineligibility to participate in a sport program due to
injury); see also Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 627–28 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that
a professional skier’s inability to take paid endorsements while playing college football did not entitle him to
injunctive relief).
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4. Self-Regulation in Professional Sports
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to substitute their own rationale for
that of professional sports leagues.134 Courts grant sports league commissioners
“best interests of the sport” authority when regulating internal league affairs.135
The autonomy sports commissioners enjoy surpasses the deference corporate
board members and company presidents possess.136
In Charles O. Finley & Company v. Kuhn, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Bowie Kuhn—Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”)
commissioner—denying club trades was not arbitrary or capricious because
Kuhn did not violate any MLB rules.137 The court observed commissioners have
broad discretion to prevent actions that are not in the best interest of the sport, so
long as the acts are in good faith.138 The Seventh Circuit maintained that a
decision by the court on the matter would be “beyond the competence and the
jurisdiction of this court to decide.”139
5. California’s Deference to Youth Sports Leagues
While the state legislature and courts can regulate youth sports, they are as
reluctant as the rest of the nation to impose regulations on the industry.140
California courts are particularly hesitant when holding sports leagues and
voluntary entities liable in negligence suits.141 In Balthazor v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., a pitch injured a minor, and the family sued the baseball
organization for not providing players with helmets equipped with face guards.142
The court held that, under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, a sports
league only has a duty not to increase the risks inherent to the sport—not a duty
to decrease them.143 The court asserted that mandating organizations to provide
equipment to avoid injuries inherent to the game would have “enormous social
and economic consequences” on the sport.144

134. Matthew J. Mitten, How Is the Integrity of Sport Protected in the United States, 19 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 89, 103 (2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 104.
137. Charles O. Finley Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1978).
138. Id. at 539
139. Id.
140. See generally Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 47, 48–49 (1998) (denying
relief to youth baseball player after a baseball hit him in face during a youth game).
141. See generally id. (1998) (denying relief to youth baseball player after a baseball hit him in face
during a youth game).
142. Id. at 49 (1998).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 52 (1998).
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C. Analysis of Non-Interventionist Model in Sports: The Pros and Cons
While the United States historically allowed the sports industry to primarily
regulate itself, individuals often question the sensibility of such a structure.145
This section analyzes the pros and cons of America’s current autonomous sports
industry and explores the viability of such a model in the future.146 Section 1
analyzes the argument that concussion management laws are ineffective within
the United States.147 Section 2 discusses how sports leagues already
predominantly regulate themselves without the help of the Legislature.148 Section
3 outlines how the increasing professionalization of youth sports demands
uniform regulation of programs—like Pop Warner—to protect the state’s
youths.149
1. Pros: Concussion Management Laws are Ineffective
Critics of sports regulations argue Chapter 158, and other state mandates, are
ineffective in preventing brain injuries from occurring.150 While Chapter 158 and
various other state laws address concussion management after receipt of injury,
no one law seeks absolute preemption.151 Most laws, such as Washington’s
Lystedt Law and California’s own Concussion Management in Youth Sports Act,
mandate return-to-play protocols—not substantive changes to the game.152 Dan
Comstock, professor at Ohio State University’s Center for Injury Research and
Policy, criticized the states’ newly enacted laws.153 “Not a single piece of any of
these laws is going to keep a kid from getting a concussion in the first place,”
exclaimed Comstock.154 Legislatures must mandate changes to the substance of
the game—not just to the protocols after the fact—to be effective at preventing
concussions.155
Additionally, critics argue concussion laws may actually have an inverse
effect on concussion safety.156 Because concussion laws lack the ability to

145. Infra Section IV.C.3.
146. Infra Sections IV.C.1–3.
147. Infra Section IV.C.1
148. Infra Section IV.C.2.
149. Infra Section IV.C.3.
150. Koller, supra note 97 at 716.
151. See Maggie Clark, Sports Concussion Laws Are a Headache for States, GOVERNING (July 20,
2012), http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct-sports-concussion-bills-headache-for-state-lawmakers.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the lack of legislative efforts addressing
concussion prevention, but rather only management).
152. Get a Heads Up on Concussion in Sports Policies, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
supra note 67; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124235 (enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516).
153. Clark, supra note 151.
154. Id.
155. See generally id. (discussing the inability of concussion management laws to prevent concussions).
156. Koller, supra note 97 at 717–18.
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prevent brain trauma, critics claim that concussion laws may produce a false
sense of safety among parents and players.157 In return, this distortion may result
in additional injuries and concussions among players.158 However, persons in
favor of concussion laws argue they achieve their primary objective—bringing
awareness to concussions—and thus are effective.159
2. Pros: Sports Leagues Already Regulate Themselves
Independent of government intervention, private leagues are already taking
initiatives to make their sport safer.160 Pop Warner spearheaded the change in
2012 by limiting full-contact drills to no more than twenty-five percent of
practice time.161 USA Football, the umbrella organization to all amateur football
leagues—includes Pop Warner—implemented the “Heads Up Football” program
across all fifty states.162 The mandatory program integrated smart tackling
techniques, equipment fitting, and coaching certification into youth and high
school leagues—including Pop Warner.163 In May 2016, Pop Warner announced
that it would eliminate kickoffs—a method in football often responsible for
concussions—in its three youngest divisions.164 In addition to the changes at the
youth level, the NFL has also implemented changes to make professional football
safer.165 Among various reforms, the NFL outlawed the three-man wedge block
during kick-offs and any intentional helmet-to-helmet contact.166 Critics of
government intervention argue these internal changes are more effective in
preventing concussions among players than government regulations.167

157. Id. at 718.
158. Id.
159. Sungwon Kim and Denial P. Connaughhton, Legislative Efforts to Reduce Concussions in Youth
Sports: An Analysis of State Concussion Statutes, J. LEG. ASPECTS OF SPORTS 27, 162–186 (2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
160. See Jill Martin, Pop Warner Eliminates Kickoffs, CNN (May 12, 2016, 6:44 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/12/sport/pop-warner-football-eliminates-kickoffs/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on Pop Warner’s policy banning kickoffs for its three youngest divisions).
161. Id.
162. Moisse, supra note 33.
163.
Heads
Up
Football
for
Youth
Leagues
and
Clubs,
USA
FOOTBALL,
https://usafootball.com/programs/heads-up-football/youth/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2019) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
164. Martin, supra note 160.
165. See Kevin Seifert, What’s Really Changed in the NFL’s ‘Call to Action’ On Concussions, ESPN
(Sep. 21, 2018), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/24743994/really-changed-nfl-call-action-concussions (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the various reforms that the NFL has
implemented since their 2018 “call to action” on concussions).
166. See id. (defining a “wedge block” as a strategy used during a kickoff when three players link
shoulder-to-shoulder and advance to block the cover team).
167. Koller, supra note 97 at 718.
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3 Cons: The “Professionalization” of Youth Sports
Studies show that seventy percent of children who play youth sports quit by
age thirteen due to “unpleasant sports experiences.”168 Scholars argue this
dramatic drop in participation is due to the growing “professionalization” of
youth sports in America.169 With non-profit youth sports programs earning over
$5 billion in revenue each year, individuals argue Pop Warner and other youth
leagues are now “big business.”170
Those opposing self-regulation of youth sports maintain the Legislature must
draw a line between professional sports and youth and interscholastic sports.171
With youth football feeder programs becoming increasingly popular, competition
and rivalry have replaced core values such as teamwork and personal growth.172
A statistic from the Center for Disease Control reveals medical professionals
treat over 3.5 million children under the age of fourteen for sports-related injuries
per year.173 Proponents of government regulation argue that this influx in injuries
summons a need for more federal and state intervention throughout youth
sports.174
D. The Future of Youth Sports in America: Continued Changes to Come
With Chapter 158 and various new laws taking effect, actors within the youth
football sphere wonder what the future holds for the sport.175 Despite sports
leagues’ previous autonomy, state and federal courts are beginning to hold them
more accountable in concussion-related negligence suits.176 Grieving mothers,
Kimberly Archie and Jo Cornell, filed a lawsuit against the Pop Warner football
league in 2016 after the CTE-related deaths of their sons, Paul Bright Jr. and
Tyler Cornell, respectively.177 In a landmark decision, United States District
Court judge Paul Gutierrez ruled that the negligence suit would continue on to

168. Jordan D. Cox, The Professionalization of Youth Sports in America, BAYLOR DEP’T. OF AMERICAN
STUDIES,
2
(Aug.
2011),
https://baylorir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/2104/8204/Jordan_Cox_masters.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
169. Id.
170. Kelley & Carchia, supra note 121.
171. Koller, supra note 97 at 718.
172. James R. Andrews, Why are There So Many Injuries to Our Young Athletes? Professionalization
and Specialization in Youth Sports, 40 BALTIMORE L. REV. 575, 577 (2010) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
173. Id. at 576.
174. Id. at 580–81.
175. Cook, supra note 47.
176. Ryan Kartje, Pop Warner Facing 2020 Trial in Lawsuit Alleging Negligence, Wrongful Death, THE
OC REGISTER (July 26, 2018), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/07/26/pop-warner-facing-2020-trial-in-lawsuitalleging-negligence-wrongful-death/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
177. Id.
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trial.178 The trial, set for January 2020, will mark Pop Warner’s first since the
league’s inception in 1929.179 Despite the case’s uncertain verdict, it signals a
new movement towards holding sports leagues more accountable for the safety of
its players.180
In addition to courts holding sports leagues more responsible, California’s
Legislature has also proposed various measures that would impose greater
regulations on leagues.181 Discussed previously, AB 2108 would have banned
youth football for all players under the age of 12.182 Although the measure failed,
its occurrence displays a slow but growing crusade against youth football in
California.183 Co-authors of AB 2108, McCarty and Gonzalez, have pledged their
continued commitment to reforming youth football within the state.184
While past regulations have predominantly dealt with protocols off the field,
more recent bills—such as AB 2108, AB 2007, and Chapter 158—mandate
substantive changes to the game.185 These changes include restricting full-contact
practice time and complete constraints on the ability to play the game based on
age.186 The Legislature’s increased comfort in regulating the substance of youth
and interscholastic football displays another growing trend: preventative
regulations that may end with youth football’s complete demise.187
V. CONCLUSION
Stories like James Ransom’s have kick-started a massive movement towards
the reformation of youth football within California.188 Chapter 158 continues this
reform, implementing numerous regulations regarding concussion management

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See generally id. (discussing the recent and unprecedented lawsuit against Pop Warner for
negligence).
181. See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.).
182. A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not
enacted).
183. See id. (proposing the prohibition of tackle football for all children under the age of 12).
184. Kartje, supra note 9.
185. See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.).
186. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 124235 (enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516); A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as
introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not enacted).
187. See generally A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8,
2018, but not enacted) (proposing the complete ban of youth football for children under the age of 12); see also
Kartje, supra note 9 (reporting on legislator McCarty and Gonzalez’s plan to continue reforming football
despite the failure of their co-authored bill, AB 2108).
188. See Kartje, supra note 176 (discussing the recent lawsuit going to trial in 2020 against the Pop
Warner football league).
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and safety.189 Despite its good intentions, Chapter 158 fails to enact any
groundbreaking protocols and breaks precedent by regulating the private sports
industry.190
Chapter 158 disrupts the government’s traditional grant of sports’ autonomy
and symbolizes the growing trend towards government regulation of sports.191
While many individuals welcome the reform, ardent football fans argue
concussion laws are ineffective and sports leagues are better equipped to regulate
themselves.192 However, as the Boeing catastrophe displayed, unregulated
industries can often foster unsafe environments.193 Supporters of concussion laws
argue that the growing professionalization of youth sports requires regulatory
oversight.194
Attempting to walk the line between both sides, Chapter 158 falls short.195 Its
regulations lack substantive changes that prevent concussions, while still
managing to disrupt previous sports league deference.196 Despite its tepid impact,
Chapter 158 signifies the beginning of a long battle for youth football’s
survival.197 With courts and legislatures more willing to hold football leagues
accountable for failing to protect its players, the future of football hangs in the
balance.198 Despite Chapter 158’s practical shortcomings, it begins an important
dialogue on the balances between private regulations and public welfare.199
Regardless of whether concussion safety or youth football prevails, in the end,
one thing is for sure: James Ransom’s death was not in vain.200
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198. See generally A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8,
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199. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158).
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